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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
U.S. Horticultural Supply, Inc. (“USHS”) appeals from an order of the District
Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment as a matter of
law to The Scotts Company (“Scotts”).  See U.S. Horticultural Supply, Inc. v. Scotts Co.,
2009 WL 89692 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2009).  USHS filed suit claiming damages from an
unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 15
U.S.C. § 1.  We will affirm.
I.
3We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Scotts is a producer of consumer and professional horticulture products that are
sold through a network of distributors to both nurseries and greenhouses.  Among its
various products, Scotts sells controlled release fertilizer (“CRF”).  Griffin Greenhouse
Supplies (“Griffin”) has been a distributor of Scotts products since at least 1993, and in
the mid-1990s Griffin began to expand its operations into the eastern part of the United
States.  USHS was also a horticultural products distributor and sold its products
nationwide.
In 1996, USHS and Scotts signed a Horticultural Products Distributor Agreement
(“1996 Distributor Agreement”).  The 1996 Distributor Agreement provided that Scotts
would deliver its products to USHS’ warehouses and customers within a defined territory. 
This territory included North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, Maryland, Delaware and Connecticut, as well as the District of Columbia and
several counties in New York.  The Agreement also provided for product delivery to
Texas and Louisiana if USHS established branches in those states.
The 1996 Distributor Agreement expired by its terms on December 23, 2000. 
Scotts, however, continued to provide product to USHS in the absence of an agreement
until August 3, 2001.  It was on that date that USHS and Scotts agreed to renew their
The details of the various documents offered by USHS as evidence of the1
conspiracy between Scotts and Griffin are well known by the parties and will not be
discussed in detail.
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distributorship agreement for a term ending September 30, 2002 (“2001 Distributor
Agreement”).  The new agreement amended the definition of territory and removed
Scotts’ obligation to provide product to USHS if USHS expanded into Texas and
Louisiana.
During the course of Scotts’ business relationship with USHS, Griffin complained
on various occasions that USHS was selling CRF below market prices and was reducing
the value of the Scotts brand.   Scotts acknowledged USHS’ aggressive pricing scheme1
but was not concerned because Scotts believed that USHS could not maintain its low
profit margins in the long-term.  Griffin proposed that Scotts drop USHS as a distributor
in 1999, but Scotts declined to end its business relationship with USHS at that time.
Scotts did, however, choose not to renew the 2001 Distributor Agreement upon its
expiration on September 30, 2002.
On March 19, 2002, prior to the expiration of the 2001 Distribution Agreement,
Scotts and USHS entered into two additional distribution agreements for two other CRF
varieties: Ficote and Grocote.  The Ficote Agreement expired by its terms on
September 20, 2003, and the Grocote Agreement expired by its terms on September 30,
2006.
USHS and Griffin reached a settlement as to the claims between those parties and2
they are not at issue in this case.
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On November 5, 2004, USHS brought a claim in district court against Scotts and
Griffin alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.   Specifically, USHS alleged that it was terminated as a distributor of Scotts’2
products because USHS’ price-cutting interfered with an agreement between Scotts and
Griffin to maintain above market price levels for the sale of CRF in the mid-Atlantic
retail market.  (Appellant’s Br. at 2.)
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a grant of summary judgment is
plenary and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. 
Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 380 (3d Cir. 2005).  In antitrust
cases, “normal summary judgment principles apply.”  In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig.,
385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004).  A court should find for the moving party “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Saldana v. Kmart Corp.,
260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
This is not to say we disagree with the District Court’s application of Matsushita3
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), in holding that the
allegations advanced by USHS were implausible.  Nor do we express disagreement with
the District Court’s finding that USHS presented insufficient evidence of the alleged
conspiracy to create a genuine issue of material fact that Scott entered into an illegal
vertical conspiracy to maintain prices and remove USHS from the market.  Rather, as a
showing of anticompetitive effect within the relevant markets is required to sustain a
Section 1 Sherman Act claim, we need not address USHS’ other arguments on appeal in
order to affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.
One of the most frequently cited descriptions of the rule of reason analysis comes4
from Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition.  To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
6
III.
The District Court entered summary judgment for Scotts.  On appeal, USHS claims
the District Court erred in finding USHS’ theory of conspiracy implausible, that there was
sufficient evidence of concerted action to defeat summary judgment, and there was
sufficient evidence of anticompetitive effect.  We find that the District Court was correct
in its determination that USHS failed to provide evidence sufficient to survive summary
judgment as to the definitions of the relevant product and geographic markets.   As such,3
we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.
A.
The District Court was correct in applying a rule of reason analysis to this Section
1 Sherman Act claim.   This analysis requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “adverse,4
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.  The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.  This
is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
As we conclude that USHS failed to provide sufficient evidence to survive5
summary judgment as to the relevant product and geographic markets, we need not
evaluate the evidence offered as to anticompetitive effect.
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anti-competitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets.”  Rossi v.
Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 464 (3d Cir. 1998).  A plaintiff can establish this
anticompetitive effect through a showing of facially anticompetitive restraints or reduced
output, increased prices or reduced quality in goods or services.  Gordon v. Lewistown
Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 210 (3d Cir. 2005).  In the alternative, this Court has also held that
“because proof that the concerted action actually caused anticompetitive effects is often
impossible to sustain, proof of the defendant's market power will suffice.”  Id.  Market
power, defined as the “ability to raise prices above those that would otherwise prevail in a
competitive market, is essentially a surrogate for detrimental effects.”  Id.  Plaintiffs in
Section 1 claims have the burden of establishing both the product and geographic markets
which make up the relevant competitive market.5
i.
USHS has the burden of defining the relevant product market.  See Pastore v. Bell
Tele. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).  “The outer boundaries of a product
Cross-elasticity is a measure of reasonable interchangeability.  As one treatise6
observes:
The economic tool most commonly referred to in determining what should
be included in the market from which one then determines the defendant's
market share is cross-elasticity of demand.  Cross-elasticity of demand is a
measure of the substitutability of products from the point of view of buyers. 
More technically, it measures the responsiveness of the demand for one
product to changes in the price of a different product.
Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 438 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997)
(quoting E. Thomas Sullivan and Jeffrey L. Harrison, Understanding Antitrust and its
Economic Implications 217 (1994)).
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market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity
of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.”  Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).  “‘Interchangeability’ implies that one product is
roughly equivalent to another for the use to which it is put; while there might be some
degree of preference for the one over the other, either would work effectively.” 
Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 206 (3d Cir. 1994).  When
assessing reasonable interchangeability, “[f]actors to be considered include price, use and
qualities.”  Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991).  As we
explained in Tunis Bros., “products in a relevant market [are] characterized by a
cross-elasticity of demand, in other words, the rise in the price of a good within a relevant
product market would tend to create a greater demand for other like goods in that
market.”  Id.6
At oral argument, there was discussion whether the argument relying on practical7
indicia evidence was waived by not being raised in the District Court.  While it is true that
USHS never used the “practical indicia” language with the court below, it did argue that
CRF constituted its own submarket and cited to cases that utilized the practical indicia
9
Where the plaintiff fails to define its proposed relevant market with
reference to the rule of reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of
demand, or alleges a proposed relevant market that clearly does not
encompass all interchangeable substitute products even when all factual
inferences are granted in plaintiff's favor, the relevant market is legally
insufficient.
Queen City Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d at 436.
We have also stated that “a well-defined submarket may constitute a relevant
product market” for antitrust purposes.  Tunis Bros. Co., 952 F.2d at 723.  In determining
the interchangeability between different products within a submarket, an antitrust plaintiff
must still provide evidence of selling price, uses, and physical characteristics.  See Am.
Bearing Co., Inc. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1984); Worldwide
Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 962 (6th Cir. 2004).  But in
determining “[t]he boundaries of such a submarket,” we can also consider “such practical
indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity,
the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct
customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.”  Brown
Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325.
USHS argues that there is a distinct market for CRF sold to nurseries and that it
presented sufficient “practical indicia” evidence to establish this “submarket.”   First,7
language.  On appeal they greatly expand on the limited argument they made to the lower
court.  For these reasons, we do not find that USHS waived this argument.
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USHS offers an internal Scotts document that states that Scotts’ competition for
manufacturing CRF was “national.”  This established, according to USHS, a distinct
group of CRF manufacturers who sold on a national level.  Second, USHS’ expert
testified that CRF had distinct and separate prices from other substitutes.  Next, Scotts
had a division devoted primarily to CRF sales to nurseries and that 85% of its CRF sales
were in fact to nurseries.  USHS also offers testimony from two former Scotts employees
that “CRF was perceived by nurseries as having ‘peculiar characteristics and uses,’
because CRF was the only type of fertilizer they could apply to crops without fear of toxic
runoffs that potentially would violate federal and state environmental regulations.” 
(Appellant Br. at 48.)
USHS further relies on a report from its liability expert, John L. Solow, to
establish that CRF is a distinct product market.  The report states that at the retail level,
CRF and plant protection products (“PPP”) are sold to nurseries and water soluble
fertilizer and PPP are sold to greenhouses.  This demonstrates that these products are
complements, rather than substitutes, so a distinct market exists for each.
Even assuming that practical indicia evidence is sufficient by itself to establish the
relevant product market under a rule of reason analysis, USHS still has the burden of
11
presenting evidence demonstrating its pricing decisions are constrained.  See Allen-
Myland, 33 F.3d at 208 n.16.
USHS’ evidence does not make “reference to the rule of reasonable
interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand” and is, therefore, legally insufficient. 
Queen City Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d at 436.  USHS’ evidence fails to discuss price and use
implications within its proposed market, which is fatal to the analysis of interchangeable
products under a rule of reason analysis in this case.  Further, USHS’ expert report does
not include specific information relating to price increases or price stability for substitute
products in relation to a rise in the price of Scotts’ CRF.  The report states only that CRF
had distinct and separate prices from other substitutes, but fails to provide any economic
analysis of these substitutes.  The failure to present evidence that its pricing decisions are
constrained cannot be overcome by the “practical indicia” evidence offered by USHS.  As
such, USHS failed to satisfy its evidentiary burden to define the relevant product market.
We find the District Court was correct in holding that USHS failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of fact as to the relevant product markets.
ii.
USHS also has the evidentiary burden of establishing the relevant geographic
markets for CRF sold to nurseries.  Pa. Dental Ass'n v. Med. Serv. Ass'n of Pa., 745 F.2d
248, 260 (3d Cir. 1984).  The District Court found that USHS failed to present evidence
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sufficient to survive summary judgment because the evidence offered to establish the
relevant geographic market did not speak to buyer behavior.  We agree.
“The relevant geographic market is the area in which a potential buyer may
rationally look for the goods or services he or she seeks . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
Consequently, the geographic market is not comprised of the region in which the seller
attempts to sell its product, but, rather, is comprised of the area where customers would
look to buy such a product.  Tunis Bros. Co., 952 F.2d at 726.  The evidence of the
geographic market presented by the party claiming a Section 1 violation must therefore
speak to buyer behavior.
USHS argues that the geographic markets for CRF are the United States at the
manufacturing level and the mid-Atlantic and New England at the retail level.
First, in defining the manufacturing level market, USHS offers various internal
Scotts documents that suggest that Scotts sold CRF on a nationwide basis and viewed the
United States as its internal definition of “market.”  USHS argues that these documents
are evidence of industry perception and should be afforded the appropriate evidentiary
weight.  The legal standard under Tunis Bros., however, is not what Scotts believes the
market is or where Scotts attempts to sell CRF, but rather where CRF distributors, like
USHS and Griffin, look to purchase CRF.  Id.  The documents offered by USHS do not
speak to this type of buyer behavior and, therefore, they do not provide legally sufficient
support for geographic markets of CRF at the manufacturing level.  Additionally, USHS’
13
expert report does not further discuss the geographic market for CRF at the
manufacturing level.
Second, USHS argues that there are both mid-Atlantic and New England retail
markets for CRF distributors.  In support of this geographic market, USHS relies on
industry publications and various internal Scotts documents.  USHS also relies on the
territorial restrictions contained in the 1996 Distributor Agreement.
Much like the evidence presented in support of the CRF market for manufacturers,
the evidence offered by USHS for the retail geographic market does not speak to
consumer preferences or behavior.  The internal Scotts documents speak to where Scotts
looked to sell its product, not where nurseries looked to purchase CRF.  Next, the
territorial restrictions included in the 1996 Distributor Agreement only speak to where
Scotts would ship CRF, not where buyers look to purchase.  USHS’ expert report also
fails to offer analysis of buyer behavior.  The report relies exclusively on the 1996
Distributor Agreement.  Further, the report does not define the mid-Atlantic or New
England markets.  The strongest piece of evidence that speaks to consumer behavior is a
comment by USHS’ CEO that nurseries and greenhouses have a strong preference for
regional distributors.  This statement, however, fails to define, even broadly, the regions
in which nurseries would seek out CRF.
14
The District Court was correct in determining that USHS failed to provide
sufficient evidence of buyer behavior to survive summary judgment with regard to its
definition of the geographic markets for CRF sold to nurseries.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
